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CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CHURCH PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS UPHELD BY
THE "BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY" OF
THE SUPREME COURT
Frederick Walz, an elderly attorney, was the owner of a 22x29 foot plot
of land on Staten Island, valued at $100.00, and was paying a property
tax of $5.24 per year.' Mr. Walz's small plot of land had been artfully
described as "0.0146 of a weed-choked acre". 2 Disregarding the small
economic burden that he had to bear, Mr. Walz contended that his prop-
erty tax would be even lower if certain other tax exempt organizations,
mainly the churches, were required to pay property taxes. At issue,
specifically, was the constitutionality of the privileged tax status of
churches and other religious organizations, who paid no real property tax
on certain church-owned property.
Mr. Walz sought an injunction in the New York courts to prevent the
New York Tax Commission from granting property tax exemptions to
religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious pur-
poses. Mr. Walz, burdened with his assessed property tax, contended that
in tax exemption afforded the churches by the government was unconsti-
tutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause of the first amend-
ment which was made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664
(1970).
The Supreme Court's decision in the Walz case had been awaited with
great interest by the legal profession and the public.3 At stake was the real
estate tax exemption for every church and religious organization in the
country. For the major religions, this was of vital importance, 4 because
1. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1969 at 35, col. 2 (late city ed.).
2. TIME, May 18, 1970, at 44.
3. It is interesting to note that the Walz case has received wide publicity by
the news and mass media. A few helpful non-legal articles are: "Should we tax
church wealth?" LOOK, May 19, 1970, at 25; "No tax on religion", TIME, May 18,
1970, at 44; "Benevolent Neutrality; Supreme Court Ruling", NEWSWEEK, May 18,
1970, at 77. Compare U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 18, 1970, at 105, with
AMERICA, May 16, 1970, at 518.
4. As an indication of the major religions' interest in the outcome of the Walz
case the following religious organizations filed briefs, as amici curiae, for affirm-
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over the decades from the founding of the nation they had acquired a
large vested interest in the nation's real estate.6
It was Mr. Walz's contention that he was, in effect, being forced un-
constitutionally to support religious institutions by virtue of the New York
property tax exemption6 afforded religious institutions. It was Mr. Walz's
position that the tax he was required to pay was a forced subsidy to
churches because he was "required" by law to pay the assessed tax or risk
punishment for nonpayment or partial payment. It was his logical argu-
ment that if the great amount of church property were taxed, all other tax-
payers' property taxes would be proportionately reduced.7 In addition to
the financial burden on each taxpayer, the tax exemption was, he con-
tended, violative of both the Establishment Clause of the first amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.8
The first amendment provides that the "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . ... ,9 The fourteenth amendment provides that "no person shall
be deprived of. . .property, without due process of law."' 0
Reading these two amendments together, Mr. Walz argued that the grant-
ing of a tax exemption to churches or religious organizations was an
"aid" which promotes the "establishment of religion."" Because the tax
exemption had the force and effect of law, and this "law" aided religions,
the Congress had promoted the "establishment of religion." The net effect
of the tax exemption was that each taxpayer, whether he desired to or
not, had to make an indirect contribution to religion.
ance: 1) The United States Catholic Conference, 2) The National Council of the
Churches of Christ, 3) Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation
of Church and State, 4) the Episcopal Diocese of New York, 5) the Church of the
Holy Apostles and Others, 6) the Baptist General Convention of Texas, 7) the Na-
tional Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, 8) the Synagogue Council
of America and its Constituents, and 9) the Parish Hall School, Inc. Walz v. Tax
Commission of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970).
5. The value of U.S. church and synagogue property has been estimated to be
$102 billion-all of it tax exempt. TIME, May 18, 1970, at 44. The ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE TAX COMMISSION FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1968-1969, cited in TIME,
supra at 33, 35, shows the religious tax exemption to be $726,010,645. There ap-
pears to be a stem reluctance on the part of religious officials to release actual real
estate figures; therefore, most estimations, such as TIME'S, supra, are merely
guesses. For a rather biased discussion of the evaluation problems, see "Should we
tax church wealth?" LooK, supra note 3.
6. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1.
7. Mr. Walz should be commended for his frugality because his tax is a
"whopping" $5.24. Supra note 2.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I and XIV, § 1.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Without the financial burden of paying taxes, the churches are relieved of a
constant and heavy drain on their treasuries.
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Mr. Walz did not choose to attack a vague, nebulous statute of doubtful
validity. He had chosen to question the validity of a concept steeped in
tradition and history. In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes: "If a thing
has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need
a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to effect it.'' 12
Mr. Walz, nevertheless, armed with his logical argument, decided to fight
the inertia of history and tradition and filed suit. Mr. Walz's suit im-
mediately ran into trouble when the Tax Commission's motion for a
summary judgment was granted. This ruling was affirmed unanimously
by the other lower New York courts, 13 and, on appeal, the New York Court
of Appeals stated that the tax exemptions were "firmly imbedded in the
law of the State" and affirmed. 14 The Supreme Court noted probable juris-
dicton,15 bringing the case before the Court for final determination.
The Supreme Court affirmed, seven to one, with four justices writing
opinions.' 6 The majority and concurring opinions base their decision
on the long established history of allowing the tax exemption, their inter-
pretation of the intent of the Establishment Clause, and the attempts by
the Court to find a "neutral course" between the two religious clauses,
"both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded
to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.' 7
From a technical legal viewpoint there are valid arguments to both
sides of the points upon which the Court rendered its decision. It will be
the purpose of this case note to familiarize the reader with the case, relate
the relevant law on the subject to the case, and ultimately lead the
reader to the significance of the Walz decision. As an introductory aside,
the Walz decision may be indicative of a "new attitude" of the Court.
This attitude may permit apparent contradictions among or between various
judicial interpretations of the Constitution. Justification for the permissive
position may be based upon a doctrine of "benevolent neutraility." Keep-
ing this as yet unclear and nebulous doctrine of "benevolent neutrality"
in mind throughout the discussion of the contradictory church tax ex-
emption agruments should permit the reader to draw his own conclusion
as to the ultimate effect of the Walz decision.
12. Jackson v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
13. 30 A.D. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1968).
14. 24 N.Y. 30, 298 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1968).
15. 395 U.S. 957 (1969).
16. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the majority opinion, with Justices Bren-
nan and Harlan concurring. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the sole dissenting
opinion in a seven to one decision.
17. Supra note 4.
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The first point, i.e., the inertia of history and tradition, could be dis-
pensed with merely by stating that the Court has in the past overruled long
standing statutory provisions, discarding tradition and history.' 8 To dis-
pense with the weight of history and tradition requires careful analysis and
verbal gymnastics. This is not, however, the type of case where the
Court could dispense with this question so easily.
Religious institutions in the United States have enjoyed tax exemptions
on their real property for nearly two-hundred years.' 9 Mr. Justice Bren-
nan reflects this in his concurring opinion:
The more longstanding and widely accepted a practice, the greater its impact upon
constitutional interpretation. History is particularly compelling in the present case
because of the undeviating acceptance given religious tax exemptions from our earliest
days as a Nation. Rarely, if ever has this Court considered the constitutionality of
a practice for which the historical support is so overwhelming.
20
The question arises just how longstanding and widely accepted was this
practice to make its historical support so overwhelming?
From the founding of the Nation, the churches have maintained a privi-
leged position. In the early days, it was common for state and local gov-
ernments to grant direct subsidies to churches. 21 Taxes were, therefore,
not levied upon the churches because this would amount to self-taxation. 22
With the adoption of the Constitution in 1791, and the expressed doc-
trine of the separation of church and state, this rationale was no longer
18. For example: Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
overruled the established custom of reading passages from the Holy Bible because
they were in preference to the Christian religion. Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239,
179 A.2d 698 (1962) prohibited the mere reading of "any passage" because this
preferred "all" religions over non-religions or atheism. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962) overruled long standing apportionment statutes, while Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), broke the traditional custom of racial segregation
in public schools. The Court's reasoning for overruling long established statutes, or
constitutional provisions is usually determined on a "case-by-case" basis; there-
fore, a study of the Court's reasoning would also have to be on a case-by-case
analysis.
19. See Brief for the American and New York Civil Liberties Union as Amicus
Curiae at 13, Walz, supra note 4.
20. Supra note 4, at 681.
21. Stimson, The Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United States,
18 MINN. L. REv. 411, 416 (1934). Today such a direct grant or subsidy would
clearly be unconstitutional. Mr. Walz might logically contend that the method is
not as important as the effect. The method may be either direct subsidy or some
other indirect method, for example, a tax exemption, but the effect is still the same,
i.e., economic assistance to the churches.
22. Zollman, Tax Exemptions of American Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REV.
646, 648-49 (1916). See Zollman generally for a detailed historical discussion of
the development of tax exemptions in the Colonies.
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valid.23 Nonetheless the exemption continued. 2 4 Due to the close relation-
ship that continued in practice between the church and state, even though
theoretically expressed and declared to be "separated," the practice of
granting tax exemptions grew. 25  By 1970, all the states had some type
of provision exempting churches from taxation on their property.26
Just how deeply rooted the practice was can be ascertained by consider-
ing its universality and large scale enshrinement in state constitutions.
Today, more than two-thirds of the state constitutions provide for the ex-
emption of church property from taxation. Of these, one-half make the
exemption mandatory; 27 the remaining require legislative action .2  The
net result is that all states have either a constitutional or legislative pro-
vision exempting religious property from taxation.29
In the present case, tax exemptions are granted specifically by Art. 16
§ 1 of the New York Constitution which provides:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may
be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used ex-
clusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes as defined by law and
owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for one
or more of such purposes and not operating for profit.8 0
23. Stimson, supra note 21, at 416.
24. See State v. Collector of Jersey City, 24 N.J.L. 108, 120 (1853); Lundberg v.
County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 645, 298 P.2d 7 (1956).
25. See generally, COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIous LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902) and
authorities cited supra notes 21, 22.
26. Infra note 27.
27. The constitutional language is mandatory in: ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 91;
ALASKA CONST. art. 9, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. 16, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 1;
Ky. CONST. § 170; LA. CONST. art. X, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.J. CONST.
art. 8, § 1, par. 2; N.M. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1;
N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 176; OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. X, § 4;
S.D. CONST. art. XI,, § 6; UTAH CONST. art. XIII, § 2; VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 183.
28. In the following constitutions the language is permissive: ARIZ. CONST. art. 9,
§ 2; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONsT. art. VII, § 2-5404; ILL. CONST. art. IX,
§ 3; IND. CONST. art. 10, § 1; Mo. CONST. art. X, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 2;
NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; NEV. CONST. art. 8, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. 5, § 5;
OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 2; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. II, § 28;
TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; W. VA. CONsT. art. X, § 1.
29. In addition to the weight given any provision or custom by such long usage,
the universality of its usage gives the provision added strength. The strength and
weight based on its universality and history had to effect the Court's determina-
tion. The question remains as to how great the effect was. The Court did not
answer the question.
30. Art. 16, § I of the New York Constitution is implemented by § 420, subd. 1,
of the New York Real Property Tax Law which states: "Real property owned by a
corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improve-
ment of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, mis-
sionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar
association, library, patriotic, historical, or cemetery purposes . .. and used ex-
Tax exemptions are also granted generally by provisions of the New York
Real Property Tax Law.81
However, the provision for exemption is made, it must be noted that
the power and authority to exempt from taxation, as well as to tax, is
intrinsically governmental. 32  Accordingly, a legislature may exempt a
person, a corporation, or any class as it sees fit "according to its views
of public policy or expediency." 3
The discretion of the legislature to grant tax exemptions appears gen-
erally very broad. In Gibbons v. District of Columbia,34 the question be-
fore the Court was whether real estate taxes assessed on land owned by,
and adjacent to, a church in Washington, D.C., but not used by that
church, were valid. At that time, the Congress granted real estate tax
exemptions to buidlings devoted to art, institutions of public charity, li-
braries, cemeteries, and church buildings, and the grounds actually occupied
by such buildings. In denying the tax exemption as to land owned by, but
not used for, the church, but rather to produce income, the Court con-
cluded:
In the exercise of this (taxing) power, Congress, like any State legislature unrestricted
by constitutional provisions, may at its discretion wholly exempt certain classes of
property from taxation, or may tax them at a lower rate than other property.385
The Court thus affirmed the legislature's power and authority in tax mat-
ters even though they denied a tax exemption to a church which did not use
the property for church related purposes.
From the foregoing discussion it appears that history and tradition
favor the exemptions, and that the legislatures have the authority and power
to grant exemptions in their sound discretion. Although this appears to be
a formidable barrier to Mr. Walz's argument, the Court has in the past
easily dispensed with the agrument that history or tradition of statute lends
weight to its validity.3 6
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in Walz, discusses the point without applying
it:
clusively for carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes . . . shall be
exempt from taxation as provided in this section."
31. New York Const. art. 16, § 1.
32. COOLEY, TAXATION 343 (3d ed. 1903). See also General Fin. v. Archetto,
93 R.I. 392, 395, 176 A.2d 73, 75 (1961); Washington Ethical Society v. Dist. of
Columbia, 249 F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
33. Lawrence Univ. vi Outagamie County, 150 Wis. 244, 246, 136 N.W. 619, 620
(1912).
34. 116 U.S. 404 (1886).
35. Id. at 408.
36. Supra note 18.
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It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of
the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our entire national
existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbroken practice of according the ex-
emption to churches, openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by state
inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside.8 7
Mr. Justice Brennan agrees, stating that "the existence from the beginning
of the Nation's life of a practice, such as tax exemptions for religious or-
ganizations is not conclusive of its constitutionality. '38
Although the Court has reaffirmed the fact that it is not bound by history
or tradition, it appears to have relied on them in this case. The Court,
in effect, has agreed with Mr. Justice Holmes' great quote that "a page
of history is worth a volume of logic." 9
The second basis upon which the Court relies in supporting its position
is its interpretation of the intent of the men who wrote the Religion Clause
of the first amendment. The Court aptly states that " . . . it seems clear
that the exemptions were not among the evils which the framers and
ratifiers of the Establishment Clause sought to avoid." 40
The Court interprets the framers' intent to have connoted "sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious ac-
tivity."'41 If the framers meant to prohibit "sponsorship or financial in-
volvement" of the government in religious activity, then what is a tax
exemption? The Court admits that it is an indirect economic benefit.4 2
Being a government-sponsored economic benefit, it must be violative of
the Establishment Clause, because Congress has made a law "respecting,"
in the establishment of religion.
If this were the only problem, the solution would be simple-abolish tax
exemptions to churches. Alas, no constitutional question has only one
side. On the other side of the coin is the "free exercise" provision of the
same amendment. This requires that the government cannot interfere
with religion to the end that religion is suppressed or controlled by govern-
ment.
To restate the problem in simpler terms: if the Free Exercise Clause
requires tax exemptions in certain situations to avoid excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion, how can one reconcile the interpreta-
37. Supra note 4, at 678.
38. Supra note 4, at 681.
39. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
40. Supra note 4, at 682.
41. Supra note 4, at 668.
42. Supra note 4, at 674.
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tion that the Establishment Clause forbids tax exemptions in the same situ-
ation? In other words, a perfect dilemma exists.
43
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in a clever understatement, rationalizes that
even though "[tihe Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First
Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitu-
tion ... [T]he purpose was to state an objective, not to write a stat-
ute."
44
Herein lies the problem: how is the Court to interpret that objec-
tive? How can the Court interpret the Religion Clause to be compati-
ble to an unstated objective when to enforce its contradictory clauses
creates a perfect dilemma?
One horn of the dilemma, as stated in Torcaso v. Watkins,45 is that
neither the State nor Federal Government
can 'constitutionally' pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions founded on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions based on different beliefs. 4 6
The inference from Torcaso is that the Constitution prohibits the govern-
ment from "aiding" religion. To carry this argument to a logical conclu-
sion both direct and indirect methods of aid are prohibited.
The landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education47 reaffirms this
position. In Everson an attack was made upon the constitutionality of
a New Jersey school transportation statute,48 pursuant to which the
Board of Education had authorized the reimbursement of parents for
amounts expended by them for the transportation of their children, not
only to public schools, but also to non-profit parochial schools. The
Court, though declaring that the prohibition of the first amendment
against "laws respecting the establishment of religion" was applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment, nonetheless held the stat-
ute valid. The Court interpreted the Establishment Clause to mean at
least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another...
no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
43. Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 COL. L.
REv., 968, 990-91 (1949).
44. Supra note 4, at 668.
45. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
46. Id. at 495.
47. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). Similar expressions may even be found in the
dissenting opinion at 24, 27, 33, 44.
48. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18:14-8 (Supp. 1948).
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teach or practice religion. . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against the es-
tablishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation' between
church and state.49
To maintain an effective "wall of separation" between church and state
would thus require that government could not support religion by giving
them indirect economic aid as here in the form of a tax exemption.
In the case of ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education, the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a "released time" program. An
Illinois statute provided for the release of students during school hours
from public school classes so that they might receive instruction in the
doctrines of their respective religious faiths in the rooms within the pub-
lic school building. In permitting the use of tax supported school build-
ings for the dissemination of religious doctrines, the state afforded an
"invaluable aid" to sectarian groups in that it helped provide pupils
for their religious classes through the use of the State's "compulsory"
school machinery. The Court held this was not a sufficient separation of
church and State.
From the landmark Everson and McCollum cases, it appears that the
state or Federal governments cannot "aid" religious organizations be-
cause this would be prohibited by the Establishment Clause of the first
amendment. Applying this by implication to the Walz case, a tax exemp-
tion is an "aid" and should therefore be invalidated."' The implication at
the time of the Everson and McCollum cases was that the constitutional
doctrines might outlaw even the common practice of relieving the religious
institutions from the burden of taxation. 2 Mr. Justice Reed, the sole
dissenter in the McCollum decision, feared that the majority were adopt-
ing a conception of "aid" to religion which might "bar every friendly
gesture between Church and State."'5
There seems to be little question that a tax exemption is an "aid." By
granting the church a tax exemption, the state has taken action favorable
to religious organizations, since they are thereby freed from the finan-
49. Supra note 47.
50. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
51. In McCollum the court recognized "... the well known fact that all churches
receive 'aid' from the government in the form of freedom from taxation." ei,
at 249.
52. See Note, Establishment of Religion Clause Appl'ed to the States, 33 CORN.
L.Q. 122, 128 (1947); Comment, 45 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1019-20 (1947); Com-
ment, 21 S. CAL. L. REV. 61, 76 (1947).
53. Supra note 50, at 255-56. His conclusion was in part, based upon a recogni-
tion that national custom has long accepted a certain intermixture of church and
state, citing tax exemption as an example. Id. at 249.
260 [Vol. XX
1971] CASE NOTES 261
cial burden of taxation. 54 This creates, in effect, an indirect subsidy-an
abbreviated form of appropriation. 55 Analysis dispels the distinctions be-
tween outright grants to religious organizations, clearly invalid under the
Everson and McCollum decisions, and tax exemptions to such organiza-
tions.56 Exemptions have been defined as simply an abbreviated form
of appropriation; they obviate the necessity for an initial outlay of funds
by such an organization in advance of a return to it of those funds by a
direct government subsidy.57
Thus the landmark cases of Everson and McCollum appear, at least
by implication, to cast doubt upon the validity of tax exemptions. If
Everson requires that the government cannot "aid all religions" and Mc-
Collum states that activities which are "invaluable aids" to religion are
prohibited, then both would be sound precedents to overrule tax ex-
emptions because tax exemptions are both "aids" and "invaluable. 58
Mr. Justice Douglas adds, in his dissent in Walz, that "one of the best ways
to 'establish' one or more religions is to subsidize them, which a tax ex-
emption does." 59
There is another important effect to the granting of a tax exemption
that should be discussed. This is the economic effect or consequences
that fall on the taxpayers like Mr. Walz. Tax exemptions, "just as in the
54. See generally, supra note 43, at 985, for a review of tax benefits ac-
corded religion in general property taxes, inheritance, estate and gift taxes, income
taxes, miscellaneous excise taxes, and employment taxes. See also, Van Alystyne,
Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461 (1957). Van Alystyne
surveys the present constitutional and statutory law of the United States relating to
property tax exemptions of church property and examines the ways in which legisla-
tive policies have been judicially applied to various types of church property.
Van Alystyne discusses the exemptions to the house of worship, church land, tangible
personal property of churches, church endowment and intangibles, living quarters for
clergymen and church personnel, church cemeteries, church affiliated schools and
colleges, and other church activities.
55. See also Curtiss, Tax Exemption of Educational Property in New York, 52
CORNELL L. REV. 551, 554 (1967).
56. See BROWN, CHURCH AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 100, 123
(1936); GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 566 (1937).
"Such public favor, i.e., exemption from taxation, was granted in the early day of
U.S. history and was considered in the same light as direct grant or appropriations."
Hunter, Tax Exemption-A Subsidy, 8 TAx MAo. 332, 352 (1930); Stimpson, supra
note 21.
57. For a broader discussion of this subject, see Baker, Tax Exemption Statutes,
7 TEX. L. REV. 50 (1928). Baker's view of exemptions is that they merely
"amounts to a gift [to the exempted organization] from the treasury of the state."
Id. at 53.
58. Tax exemptions are so invaluable to churches that without them, there is
little doubt that the poorer churches would p[a]rish.
59. Supra note 4, at 701.
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case of a direct appropriation . . . result in the infliction of a greater
burden on the mass of taxpayers."60 The exemption granted to churches or
other religious organizations necessitates the imposition of a higher tax rate
upon the general public to supply the revenues which would otherwise
be forthcoming from those sources excused. 61
The burden that Mr. Walz complains of is well stated in Snyder v.
Town of Newton:62
An exemption from taxation is the equivalent of an appropriation of public funds, be-
cause the burden of the tax is lifted from the back of the potential taxpayer (the
church, emphasis added) who is exempted and shifted to the back of others. 63
[e.g. Mr. Walz].
The ultimate effect of the shifted burden is that all taxpayers must indi-
rectly support religious organizations because the government has to ob-
tain their tax support from somewhere. If one taxpayer is exempted or
doesn't pay his full share, the other taxpayers must bear the difference.
In addition to bearing the difference, the taxpayers are "required" by
the tax laws to pay the assessed tax. If one does not pay, he is liable
for the deficiency and may incur criminal punishment under the tax
evasion or tax delinquency laws. The ultimate effect of the tax regula-
tions is that the government has "required" the taxpayer's support of
religious institutions. The taxpayer thus has no means of avoiding the
support of religious instruction. His support is guaranteed by the State
itself.64  The guarantees are the various tax laws which require com-
pliance and have punishment for evasion. It is difficult to deny that tax
exemptions are indirectly an aid to religion. Literally, tax exemptions are
laws "respecting" the establishment of religion.
The privilege or "aid" given the churches has reached an alarming pro-
portion.65 By a conservative estimate, one-third (over $280 billion) of
60. Supra note 43, at 985. See also 11 MINN. L. REV. 541, 555 (1927); 3
RUTGERS L. REV. 115, 122 (1949).
61. Accord, In re Swigert, 119 Il1. 83, 87, 6 N.E. 469, 471 (1886); Nichols v.
School Directors, 93 Ill. 61, 64 (1879); Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86, 88 (1853); Church
of the Holy Faith v. State Tax Comm'n, 39 N.M. 403, 415, 48 P.2d 777, 784 (1935).
See generally Baker, supra note 57, at 53; Hunter, supra note 56, at 352; Paulsen,
Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 152-56 (1946).
62. 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960).
63. Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at 776.
64. 9 STAN. L. REV. 336, 374 (1956).
65. During the fiscal year of 1964, each American family, by virtue of the tax-
ing statutes of the several states and the federal government, involuntarily con-
tributed an estimated $32.00 in support of religious institutions. The same statutes
that indirectly compelled each American family to contribute $32.00 in support of
religious institutions are those which exempt from taxation religiously owned prop-
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the total value of real property in the United States is exempt from real
property taxation.6 6 Mr. Walz's contention that his taxes would be sub-
stantially lower appears to be well-founded. 67
In light of the preceding facts, there must be some justification for
permitting the tax exemption to continue. The defenses usually ex-
pounded to mitigate the economic tax loss resulting from the tax exemp-
tions are: 1) to reward the private institutions for rendering socially
desirable services; 8 2) to compensate the private institutions for render-
ing services, (e.g., education) which, but for the performance by the
private institution, would have to be performed by govemment; 69 3) to
encourage religious teaching because such teaching improves the moral
tone of the community;70 4) to promote or encourage the particular
activity or function conducted by the institution;71 5) to encourage their
unique contributions to the pluralism of American society by promoting
diversity of viewpoint, enterprise, and association.7 2
It has been said that the substantive effect of granting a tax exemp-
tion, although often obscured by form, is no less than an appropriation
of public funds to the private institution in consideration for rendered
or future services.73 The argument has also been made that the orga-
erty. By virtue of these statutes, an estimated $80 billion of real estate was ex-
empted from taxation during fiscal 1964. As a result, religious institutions avoided
paying an estimated tax of $1.6 billion. LARSON, CHURCH WEALTh AND BUSINESS
INCOME 51 (1965).
66. NEWSWEEK, May 5, 1969, at 71.
67. In New York City alone, if religious institutions were taxed on their exempt
property, an additional $35 million in revenue would have been realized in the
fiscal year 1969. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
68. People ex rel. Outer Court, Inc. of the Order of the Living Christ v. Miller,
161 Misc. 603, 292 N.Y.S. 674 (1939).
69. Connecticut Junior Republic Ass'n v. Town of Litchfield, 119 Conn. 106,
174 A. 304 (1934); Hazen v. National Rifle Association of America, 101 F.2d 432
(D.C. Cir. 1938).
70. Accord, Trustees of First M.E. Church v. Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181, 191 (1886);
Garrett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst Bank, 331 Ill. 308, 318, 163 N.E. 1, 4 (1928);
Commonwealth v. Y.M.C.A., 116 Ky. 711, 719, 76 S.W. 522, 523 (1903); Trinity
Church v. Boston, 118 Mass. 164, 165 (1875); Lefevre v. Mayor of Detroit, 2
Mich. 587, 592 (1853); State v. Board of Foreign Missions, 221 Minn. 536, 542,
22 N.W.2d 642, 645 (1946); Y.M.C.A. v. Douglas County, 60 Neb. 642, 83
N.W. 924 (1900); Church of the Holy Faith v. State Tax Comm'n, 39 N.M. 403,
415, 48 P.2d 777, 784 (1935); People ex rel. Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v.
Barber, 42 Hun. 27, 30 (N.Y. Gen. Term 5th Dept. 1886); Howell v. Philadelphia,
8 Phila. Com. P1. 280, 281 (Pa. 1871).
71. Rutgers Chapter of Delta Upsilon Fraternity v. City of New Brunswick,
129 N.J.L. 238, 28 A.2d 759 (1942).
72. See Washington Ethical Society v. Dist. of Col., 249 F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
73. Supra note 62.
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nizations rendering or contemplating services beneficial to the general pub-
lic "merit subsidy in the form of tax privileges." 74
With the merits in mind of both the arguments concerning tax exemp-
tions, one has to wonder how the Court will interpret the meaning of
"establishment" with regard to the separation doctrine prohibiting the
government from "aiding" religious organizations. The Court has three
views on the meaning of "separation": 1) active cooperation; 2) absolute
separation; 3) cooperative separation. 75 Active cooperation means only
that the government cannot give one religion preferential treatment over
others. This doctrine has been rejected by the Court in the past two
decades. 76
Absolute separation rejects all intercourse between the sphere of gov-
ernmental activity and religious activity, direct or indirect.77 This doc-
trine derives its strength and validity from a literal interpretation of the
phraseology of the first amendment-"no law respecting an establishment
of religion." s78 Accordingly, any law that recognized a particular reli-
gious activity and allowed it to continue would be repugnant to the mean-
ing and intent of the first amendment. This doctrine was rejected by
the Court in Zorach v. Clauson.79
Cooperative separation, although recognizing the principle of the sepa-
ration of church and state, rejects the view that an application thereof
necessarily prohibits all intercourse between church and state.80 If all
intercourse between church and state is not necessarily prohibited, then
some intercourse must be permissible. The question is thus one of degree.
Is a tax exemption within the permissible degree of intercourse between
church and state?
Where has the preceding discussion of the history and tradition of tax
exemptions, the intent of the framers of the Religion Clause, and the real
74. KILLOUGH, EXEMPTIONS TO EDUCATIONAL, PHILANTHROPIC, AND RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS IN TAX POLICY LEAGUE, TAX EXEMPTION 23, 28-29 (1939).
75. See KoNVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE, Ch. 9 (1957).
76. Supra note 47, at 15-16. "Neither state governments nor the Federal Gov-
ernment can pass laws which aid one religion, all religions, or prefer one religion
over another."
77. In support of a doctrine of absolute separation, see the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Rutledge in Everson v. Board of Education, supra note 47.
78. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952), "We cannot read into
The Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion."
80. Speaking for the majority in Zorach v. Clauson, Mr. Justice Douglas sum-
marized the attitude of the Court: "The Constitutional standard is separation of
church and state. The problem, like many problems of constitutional law, is one of
degree." Id. at 314.
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economic effect of the tax exemption led us? It has led us to the point
where the Court knows the facts, the legal arguments, and the probable
outcome. All that is left is for it to render its decision.
This necessitates the third point, i.e., the efforts by the Court to main-
tain a neutral position with regard to the Religion Clause. The ability of
the Court to dodge the real issue and come up with a "modified" neu-
trality rule was the downfall of Mr. Walz. The Court probably didn't feel
it was the proper time to "sink the boat" in reference to the Religion Clause
although it has gently rocked it in previous decisions. 8 '
The Court states that "the general principle deducible from the First
Amendment . . . is that we will not tolerate either governmentally es-
tablished religion or governmental interference with religion . . . . [T]here
is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference." 8 2
"No perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existence
of the Religion Clause is an involvement of sorts-one which seeks to
mark boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement. 83  "Grants of exemp-
tion historically reflect the concern of authors of constitutions and statutes
as to the latent dangers inherent in the imposition of property taxes; ex-
emption constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against
these dangers." '8 4
"Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvment of
government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens,
tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in
the train of those legal processes."188  The end result, therefore, is to
avoid an excessive government entanglement with religion. The test is one
of degree.
"The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement be-
tween church and state and far less than taxation of churches. It restricts
the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends to complement
and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other."86
Where does the Walz decision leave use? One can honestly repeat what
has been said many times before the Walz case:
81. As an example, consider the school prayer cases, supra note 18.
82. Supra note 17, at 668-70.
83. Supra note 17, at 670.
84. Supra note 4, at 673.
85. Supra note 4, at 674.
86. Supra note 4, at 676.
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One of the most persuasive and firmly established anomalies in American law is
the permissibility of subsidation of religious institutions through tax exemptions in a
legal order constitutionally committed to the separation of church and state.8 7
The colonial custom of levying taxes to support religious institutions thus
has not completely disappeared upon the disestablishment of church and
state; only the form thereof has changed. 88
The Supreme Court has apparently laid to rest the argument that any
aid to religion is unconstitutional. The Court appears again to have
traversed successfully the "tightrope" of constitutional issues by utilizing
the approach of "benevolent neutrality." This approach is a far cry from
the absolutists' interpretation of the "wall of separation" doctrine ex-
pounded for so many years. The question still remains, however, as to
whether this doctrine of "benevolent neutrality" can avoid the problem of
"excessive entanglement."
John Lundquist
87. See generally, JOHNSON AND YOST, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES (1948); PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953); Aud-
speth, Separation of Church and State in America, 33 TEX. L. REV. 1035 (1955);
Konvitz, Separation of Church and State: The First Freedom, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 44 (1949); Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARv. L. REV.
1306 (1949); Van Alystyne, supra note 54.
88. Comment, Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions Accorded American Church
Property, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 58 (1966).
